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The Effect of Variation of Ballot Form on the Vote
RICHARD
J. TruLLINc and MARKERICKSON
Duke University

I.
Among the numberous factors which influence the outcome of an
election, one set of factors-variation in ballot form-has been given
minimal emphasis in election analysis. In this paper we shall present
additional evidence to suggest that variations in ballot form can influence
both the decision making of the individual voter and the aggregate
outcome of an election.
Variations in ballot form refer to differences in the organization and
positioning of offices and propositions on ballots used by voters, including distinctions between voting machine ballots and paper ballots. That
such variations can affect electoral behavior has been documented by
many scholars. 1 Among the many propositions which have been put
forth, we shall examine the following:
( 1) that the installation of voting machines affects electoral participation, specifically by reducing turnout for Constitutional
Amendment races; 2
(2) that the installation of voting machines can influence the outcome of Constitutional Amendment races; 3
1 See for example Henry M. Bain and Donald S. Hecoclc, Ballot Positioning and
Voter Choice: The Arrangement of Names on the Ballot and Its Effect on the Voter
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse ,
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley,
1960) , pp. 266-289; John E. Mueller, "Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Pattern
and Historical Trends in California ," American Political Science Review, 63 (1969) ,
1297-1312; Jerrold Rusk, "The Effect of the Australian Ballot on Split Ticket Voting
in 1870-1908," American Political Science Review, 64 ( 1970), 1220-1238; Norman
C. Thomas, "Voting Machines and Voter Participation in Four Michigan Constitutional Revision Referenda," Western Political Quarterly, 21 (1968), 409-419; Jack
R. Walker, "Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and
Party Column Ballots," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10 ( 1966), 448-463.
For a history of the ballot , see Walter Dean Burnham , "The Changing Shape of
the American Political Universe," American Political Science Review , 59 ( 1965),
7-28; and Burnham, "Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse's
'Change in the American Electorate,' " American Political Science Review, 68 ( 1974) ,
1002-1023.
2 George B. Mathers , A Preliminary Report of an Analysis of the Effects of the
Use of Voting Machines in Voting on Special Questions in [owQ,--1920-1956 (Iowa
City: Institute of Public Affairs, University of Iowa, 1964) ; Thomas, op. cit.
3 Thomas, op. cit.

97

98

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

( 3) that position on a ballot can influence the partisan division of
the vote; 4 and,
( 4) that the form of the ballot can affect roll-off, or the difference
in participation between rac es at the top of the ballot and races
at the bottom of the ballot. 5
Our data will come from the results of several elections in Durham
County, North Carolina, beginning in 1952, when Durham County began
to install voting machin es, through 1970.6

II.
Participation in referenda on constitutional amendments varies
according to whether voting machines are used or not. George B. Mather
published a study in which he showed that the use of voting machines
rather than paper ballots in such elections results in lower participation. 7
Norman P. Thomas concurs with Mather's findings and suggests that
the more complex mental and physical actions that are required to cast
a referendum vote on a voting machine explain this occurrence. 8 His
study of the voting on referendum questions in Michigan reveals the
data of Table 1.
TABLE 1. Participation Levels in Machine and Paper Ballot Precincts in Four
Referenda Questionsa

1958

1960

1961

1963

Machine .... . ..... ...............
61.0%
65.0%
83.0%
94.0%
Paper ...........
...... ..........
87.0%
87.0%
99.0%
100.0%
................
. . . . . . . . . 74.0%
Total
92.0%
76.0%
97.0%
a Source: Norman C. Thomas, "Voting Machines and Voter Participation in
Four Michigan Constitutional Referenda ," Western Political Quarterly, 21 ( 1968),
p. 415.

In 1952, Durham County was in the process of replacing its paper
ballots with voting machines. Consequently, six precincts-Pearson,
Lakewood, Fuller , Hillside, Bragtown , and Forest Hills-used voting
machines while the rest of the precincts still had paper ballots. This
transition period provides us with a convenient measure of the ballot's
effect on the outcome of Constitutional Amendment races and more
specifically, whether participation on Constitutional Amendment contests is higher on paper ballots or voting machines.
4 Bain and Hecock, op. cit.; Howard White, "Voters Plump for First on the
List," National Municipal Review , 39 ( 1950 ), 110-111.
5 Walker, op. cit.
6 Election results were gathered from the Durham Morning Herald and Durham
Sun newspapers from 1952 through 1970.
7 Mather, op. cit.
s Thomas, op . cit.
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In the six voting machin e precincts, 7,123 people voted in the election. Of these voters, 37.2% voted on Amendment I; 35.4% voted on
Amendm ent II ; and 35.6% voted on Amendment III. The percentage
of participation in the pap er ballot precincts was much greater, however.
In th e p aper ballot precincts , 23,488 people voted in th e 1952 election.
Of the se 23,488 voters, 75.5% voted on Amendment I; 69.4% voted on
Amendment II ; and 67.5% voted on Amendm ent III. ( See Table 2.)
TABLE 2.

Ame ndme nt
I
II
III ........
Average

Participation in Constitutional Amendment Races in 1952
Pap er
Machin e
Difference

. .. . .....

. .....

.

75.5 %

37.2 %

38.3%

69.4 %

35.4 %
35.6 %
36.1 %

34 .0%

67.5 %

70 .8%

31.9%

34.7%

The data show, then, that ther e is a substantial difference between p articipation on these special qu estions on voting machin es and on pap er
ballots.
Several explanations can be offered for the Durham County data.
Fir st of all, because voting machines were new , many peopl e may hav e
been unsure as to how to operate them. Second , the Constitutional
Amendment questions were not placed centrally on the machine ballot ,
but instead, these special questions were located above the major offices.
Th erefore, many peopl e entering the voting booth may have had th e
major offices in mind and might not have focused on the Amendment
issues, thus producing the low participation rates. Third, the format of
the p aper ballots was crucial. A separat e ballot was handed out for each
group of races. Hence, the Constitutional Amendment contests occupied
their own ballot. This forced people to focus on these qu estions individ ually without being detract ed by the other races. Th e ballot , in effect,
increased the visibility and importanc e of the Amendment questions and ,
consequ ently, made voters more apt to vote in the election. In short,
particip ation on Constitutional Amendm ent questions was shown to be
higher on paper ballots as opposed to voting machines.
Finally , the Board of Elections might have introduc ed votin g machine into precincts in which it anticipated the least resistanc e to their introdu ction and th e least difficulty in their use. If in fact voting machine
precinct voters were systematically different from nonmachine precinct
voters with respect to one or more criteria other than the pr esence of
the machines, then th ese other differenc es might account for th e differences we have observed in th e voting behavior of machine and p ap er
ballot pr ecincts. Our examination reve als, however, that the six precincts
that contained the voting machines in 1952 were not distinguished from
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the other pr ecincts in Durham County with regard to socioeconomic
status, race, or educational level, so the Board of Elections seems not
to have chosen these precincts on the basis of one or more of these
census characteristics. In turn, socioeconomic status, race, and educational level do not seem to account for the differences in Table 2 between voting machine precincts and paper ballot precincts.
III.
Thomas also feels that machine precincts tend to be more supportive
of state constitutional revision than paper ballot precincts. 9 This was
found to be true even when he controlled for partisan tendency, urbanrural composition, anl census characteristics. ( See Table 3.)
TABLE 3. Mean Percentage Support for Constitutional Revision in Machine and
Paper Ballot Precincts"

1958

1960

1961

1963

Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53.0%
37.0%
48.0%
46.0%
Pap er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.0%
42.0%
31.0%
45.0%
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.0%
44.0%
34.0%
46.0%
• Source: Norman C. Thomas, "Voting Machines and Voter Participation in
Four Michigan Constitutional Referenda, " Western Political Quarterly, 21 (1968) ,
p. 415.

This observation is also easily testable in Durham County due to
the ballot transition in 1952. In this year , three Constitutional Amendments were brought up for votes. The first Amendment provided for a
limitation of tax levies; the second dealt with the procedure of filling
vacancies in certain legislative offices; and the third concerned the
filling of vacancies in certain state offices.
On Amendment I, 2,534 people voted in voting machine precincts;
69.0% voted in favor of the reform, while 31.0% voted against the Amendment. In the paper ballot precincts, 17,830 people voted; 63.0% voted
in favor of the reform, whereas 37.0% voted against the Amendment.
On Amendment II, 2,801 people voted in the machine precincts;
71.0% voted "yes," for reform, while 29.0% voted "no." In the pap er
ballot precincts, 16,004 voted and 67.0% supported the revision and
33.0% did not.
On Amendment III, 2,346 people voted in the voting machine areas.
Of these people , 72.0% favored the reform and 28.0% did not. In the
paper ballot precincts, 16,033 voted, of which 77% voted "yes" and 23.0%
voted "no."
9

Jbid., p. 415.
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TABLE 4. Effects of Voting Machines on Affirmative Responses to Proposed
Constitutional Amendments

Amendment I
Machine
For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69.0 %
Against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.0%
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0%
(N)
...........
. . . .....................
(2534)
Amendment II
For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Against
...................................
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(N)
.........................
. ... .. . . .....
Amendment III
For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(N)
.... .. .... . ...........................

Pap er

63.0%
37.0%
100.0 %
(17839)

71.0 %
29.0 %
100.0 %
(2801)

67 .0%
33.0%
100 .0%
(16004)

72.0 %
28.0 %
100.0%
(2346)

77.0%
23.0%
100.0 %
(16033)

Thomas' assertions are thus partially correct for the case of Durham
County in 1952. A slightly higher proportion of participants in th e voting
machine precincts voted in favor of Constitutional revision in two out
of three rac es. Voting machine precincts favored the first Amendment
almost 40 percentage points more than th eir counterparts voting on
paper ballots. However, the paper ballot pr ecincts regist ered a 5.0%
high er acceptance of the third Constitutional question than did th e
voting machine precincts.
What is clear from these Durham data, however, is that th e individual Constitutional question can affect both participation rates and
divisions of the vote. In paper ballot precincts , approximately 11.0%
more p eople voted for Amendm ent I ( limitation of tax levies) than for
either Amendment II ( filling vacanci es of certain legislative offices) or
Amendment III ( filling th e vacancies of certain state offices). Yet the
number of voters for Amendment I fell betwee n the number of Amend ment II and the number for Amendment III, even though th e percent
opposing I and the number opposing I both surpassed the respective
figures for th e other Amendments .
Amendment differences are also evident within the group of voting
machine precincts. Here , however , Amendment II attracted the largest
number of participants and the largest number of supporters.
In sum, although voting machine precincts and pap er ballot precincts seem to differ in th e extent of their support for Constitutional
revision, the natur e of th e proposed Constitutional revision can cause
greater variation in support th an that caused by the machine versus
paper ballot distinction.
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IV
Having discussed the importance of the type of ballot ( voting machine or paper), we shall now examine the effect of name position on
the ballot. In general, the studies done on this topic reveal that positioning plays little or no part in high visibility elections. The importance
of position on the ballot emerges, however, in elections that the voters
are apt to know little about, for example races given little press coverage
or races for more obscure offices. For instance, in Howard \Vhite's study
of the 1948 Republican primary for an Ohio Senate seat in which I. E.
Baker defeated William Tyrell, the data reveal that the candidate
whose name appears at the top of the ballot will benefit from that
position. In the 144 voting machine precincts where Baker's name
appeared first, 7,262 votes were cast of which Baker won 61.5% and
Tyrell 38.5%. Tyrell's name appeared first in 128 precincts in which a
total of 6,218 votes were cast. Tyrell won 59.9% of these votes while
Baker got 40.5%. Thus, 60.0% of the total was cast for the name appearing on the top line. Additionally, out of the 272 voting machine precincts,
231 ( 84.9%) were carried by the candidate whose name appeared on
the top line whereas only 33 ( 12.1% ) were carried by the candidate
whose name appeared on the second line ( eight precincts were tied) .10
Similar data were found by Henry M. Bain, Jr. and Donald J.
Hecock in their studies of elections in several Michigan cities . They
discerned that position was a significant factor determining voter choice
in primary and non-primary elections when both paper ballots and voting machines were used. According to them, the first position on the
ve1tical list was universally preferred when paper ballots were used.
However, no position within any one horizontal row was consistently
favored. 11
In elections with a long list of candidates, additional positions seem
to be favored. In a race for a new Junior College's Board of Trustees in
California, there were 133 candidates of which seven were to be elected.
The names were listed alphabetically in a vertical line over seven pages
of a ballot. One would expect that the order effect on a list of tlus length
would follow a T' curve pattern; that is, while the names at the top
of the list gain substantially from that position, those at the bottom
of the list would benefit somewhat as well. According to this theory,
the worst position to occupy is shortly before the end. Traces of this
effect were seen in the Junior College election but with a modified
application. Because the names were listed over seven pages of a ballot,
10
11

White, op. cit.
Bain and Hecock, op. cit.
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the candida tes who appeared first and last on each p age did receive
some 5,000 votes more than one would expect on the basis of other considerations.12 Hence, the "J" curve hypothesis seems to be correct.
Ballot position is also a crucial factor in determining th e amount
of abstentio n an item garners. A non-controversial proposition which
can be expected to have a relatively low abstention rate seems to hav e a
higher one if it is placed among propo sitions with high expecte d abstention rates. Similarly, rac es which immediately follow intensely fought
contests seem to have lower abstention rates than normally would be
expected.13 Our study of a series of Senatorial and Congr essional races
in Durham County seems to reflect these findings, too.
During Presidential election years, the senate race has always been
placed toward the end of the Durham County ballot. How ever, in nonPresidential election years, the Senatorial contest is given the first or
second position on the ballot. An examina tion of th e elections for the
years 1950 to 1968 shows that in every case a higher p ercent age of
election participants vote for the senate contest in non-Pr esidential years.
In 1950, both Sena te seats were up for election-one seat had to
be filled for an unexpired term. Of the voters who went to the polls,
94.8% voted in the regular term race and 94.6% voted in the une>..
-pired
term race . In 1954, one of th e seats was up for re-election. Since it was
a non-Presidential year, the contest was placed second on the ballot
and 95.4% of th e voters that year participat ed in th e Senate election .
The other seat came up for election in 1956--a Presidential year-and,
consequently, it was plac ed in the twenty-fifth position on the ballot.
That year the race received only 77.6% participation.
In 1960, the Senate race was plac ed in th e sixteenth position on
the ballot. The p ercentage of participants who voted for that race was
74.7%. Th e off-year Senat e seat election in 1962 was placed at the top
of the ballot and 78.9% of the voters that year expressed a pr eference
in the race. Finally, in 1966, with the rac e locat ed near the top once
again, 80.3% voted in the contest. Hence, each year that the Senatorial
race was placed near th e top of tl1e ballot , it received proportionat ely
fewer abstentions than when it appeared near the bottom. ( See Tabl e 5.)
This same ph enomenon can be observed in the Congression al rac es
in Durham County as well. Each year that the Senatorial race shifted
positions, the Congressional race did likewise, while the other races
remained more or less stationary .
12 John E. Mueller , "Choosing Among 133 Candidat es," Public Opinion Quarterly, 34 (1970), p. 399.
13 Mueller, "Voting on the Propositions," op. cit., p. 1207.

104

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

TABLE 5.

Number
Race
Number
Race

S.enatorial Race Participation Rates, 1950-1966
Positi.on of Race on Ballot
Top
Bottom
1950
1954 1962
1966
1956
1960
of Voters in Senatorial
22814 26899
.........
.....
....
6771° 5018 11436 20961
of Voters in Senatorial
0
77.6% 74.7%
as % of All Voters ... . .. 94.7% 95.4% 78.9% 80.3%

28121 36030
Total Number of Voters . . . . . . . . 7159° 5261 14497 25036
0
This number represents the average of the two Senatorial races that year.

In 1960, 1964, and 1968 the Congressional race was located near
the bottom of the ballot and these races received participation rates of
77.8%, 76.8% and 83.8%, respectively. However, when this race was
placed at the front of the ballot, as it was in 1962, 1966, and 1970, the
participation rates were 90.0%, 97.0%, and 96.4%. In short, abstention
rates were quite a bit higher when the Congressional contest was given
a less visible position. ( See Table 6.)
The difference in abstention and participation rates would seem
to correspond to known differences between the electorates participating
in Prsidential election years and those participat:iJ:\g in off-year elections.
Roll-off occurs in Presidential election years because peripheral voters
who have entered the electorate to vote for President fail to vote for
lesser offices. Their low levels of political interest are not sufficient to
sustain their participation in elections for offices which have generated
lower levels of political stimuli and publicity. Thus, these peripheral
voters fail to vote for offices listed toward the bottom of the ballot. In
off-year elections, these peripheral voters have not been attracted to
the polls, so that the participating electorate is composed mainly of core
voters. 14 The core voter, who is able to sustain his own interest in
politics and elections even in off-year elections, despite the reduced
levels of political stimuli in off-year elections, might therefore be
expected to participate in all of the races listed on the ballot. In fact,
for Senatorial and Congressional elections, the more visible ballot position in off-year elections is probably not necessary to stimulate the
14 The seminal piece on core and peripheral voters is Angus Campbell, "Surge
and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change ," pp. 40-62 in Angus Campbell, Philip
E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political
Order (New York: Wiley, 1966). See also Robert B. Arsenau and Raymond E.
Wolfinger, "Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections," paper prepared for delivery
at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Jung
Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 4-8, 1973; and Samuel Kernell, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the MidTerm Electoral Decline of the President's Party," paper prepared for delivery at the
1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Palmer House
Hotel , Chicago, Illinois, August 29-September 2, 1974.
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TABLE 6.

Congressional Race Participation Rates, 1960-1970
Positwn of Race on Ballot
Top
Bottom
1962
1966
1970
1960
1964
1968
Number of Voters in Congressional
27658 30560 37921
13044 24844 21809
Race .... . . . ................
Number of Voters in Congressional
77.8% 76.8% 83.8%
Race as % of All Voters ...... 90.0% 97.0% 96.4%
36030 39777 45227
. . 14497 25036 22616
Total umb er of Voters .......

participation of these core voters, whereas the less visible ballot position in Presidential election years serves only to make it easier for peripheral voters to leave the electorate and to cause roll-off. We might
suppose that a more prominent position for Senatorial and Congressiona l
races on the Presidential-year ballots could increase the participation
of peripheral voters in these contests. At the same time , a less prominent
position on the off-year ballots probably would not seriously affect the
participation rates of the core voters, who make up such a large portion
of the off-year electorate. 1 6
Roll-off reflects not only the presence of peripheral voters in the
participating electorate but also general "voter fatigue," which can be
induced by increasing the complexity of the ballot. 16 For instance, rolloff is more widespread when the Office Block version of the Australian
Ballot is used rather than the Party Column version, 17 since the Office
Block requires more effort to complete. Kansas adopted the Office Block
Ballot in 1913 and roll-off from the race for the Presidency to that for
the House of Representatives increased sharply. 1 8 ( See Table 7.)
Further proof of the roll-off resulting from ba1lot form can be
found in a comparison of Ohio and Michigan, two states with similar
TABLE 7.

Percent Roll-OH From President to National House of Representatives

in Kansas, 1896-1 932G

Election Year
1896 1900 1904 1908 191211920
1924 1928 1932
Election Year
1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1920 1924 1928 1932
% Roll-Off . . . . . . . 3.0% 3.0% 5.0% 1.0% 4.0% 9.0% 8.0% 10.0% 9.0%
8 Source: Jack R. Walker , "Ballot Form and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the
Office Block and Party Colurnn Ballots," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10
( 1966), p. 452.
16 The findings of Campbell, et al., The American Voter, op. cit., would siniilarly
suggest that core voters would be more or less impervious to the form of the ballot
while peripheral voters would be most sensitive to variations in ballot form. As
they state the proposition (p. 283; emphasis in original): "formal poUtical institutions have their greatest impact on behavior when the attitudes relevant to that
behavior are least intense."
16 Walker, op. cit., p. 452.
17 For a description of the Office Block and Party Column versions of the
Australian Ballot, see Rusk, op. cit.
18 Walker, op. cit., p. 452.
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economic structures, political competition, and social backgrounds of
their populations. 19 Ohio adopted the Office Block in 1949 and Michigan
used the Party Columns throughout the same p eriod. ( See Table 8.)
In comparing the roll-off rates in Ohio and Michigan , we can see
that the introduction in 1949 of the Office Block Ballot had a major
impact on the rate of roll-off. When the Office Block was adopted in
TABLE 8. Comparison of Roll-OH in Michigan
Election
Year
Offices Involved
1940
Pres.-State Sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1942
Gov.-State Sec. .........
. ' . . ......
Pres .-State Sec. ..... . . . . ... . ......
1944
Gov.-State Sec. .... . .... . . . .. . ....
1946
1948
Pres.-State Sec. ................
. ..

and Ohio, 1940-1958a
Percent Roll-Off
Michigan Difference
Ohio
5.4%
3.6%
9.0%
8.0%
0.0%
8 .0%
2.0 %
5.9%
7.9%
7.5 %
5.6%
1.9%
2.0%
1.0%
3.0%

4.0%
4.0 %
Gov .-State Sec. ...................
8.0%
Pres.-State Sec. ...........
' ......
. 10.0%
1.0%
9.0%
7.0 %
2.6%
4.4%
Gov.-State Sec. . ... .. .. ..........
10.3%
3.0%
7.3 %
Pres.-State Sec. ...................
2.8 %
4.8 %
Gov.-State Sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3%
n Source: Jack R. Walker, "Ballot Form and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the
Office Block and Party Column Ballots ," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10
(1966), p. 454.
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958

~

Ohio, roll-off doubled. In the period from 1940 to 1948, the differences
in roll-off between the two states averaged 2.4%; but in the period
from 1950 to 1958, the average difference was 5.8%.20
The positioning of the races on the voting machines in Durham
County allows us to study the roll-off in several elections as it is caused
by ballot placement. An examination of the ballots on which the Presidential contest appears reveals that sometimes the Presidential race is
located on the same line as the rest of the races. This means that by
pressing one lever, one can vote a straight ticket on all races. However,
during other years, the Presidential race is given a separate line. One
has to vote for the Presidential race separately. A look at the roll-off
rate behveen the Presidential race and the Secretary of State race will
help us determine whether separating the Presidential contest from the
rest of the ballot increases roll-off.
On the voting machine ballots in 1952, the Presidential race was
located on the same line as the other races. One lever was sufficient
to vote a straight ticket for all the positions; 98.9% of the voters particiIbid.
James K. Pollack, The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan (Ann Arbor:
Michigan Government Studies No. 6, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan,
1940).
19

2o
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pated in the Presidential contest and 93.0% participated in the Secretary of State contest. Thus, the roll-off rate was 5.9%.
In 1956, the Presidential race was placed above the rest. One was
forced to vote for one's Presidential preference and the rest of one's
choices separately. With this format, 96.2% of those taking part in the
election voted in the Presidential race and 79.6% voted for their choice
for Secretary of State. Roll-off equalled 16.6%.
The 1960 ballot had the same format as the 1952 ballot. The statistics
for the year showed 92.6% voting for President, 78.0% voting for Secretary of State, and a roll-off rate of 11.6%.
In 1964 and 1968, the Presidential and other races were separate.
In 1964, 95.9% of the voters voted for President and 76.0% voted for
Secretary of State, with a roll-off of 19.9%. In 1968, 94.4% participated
in the Presidential contest and 78.4% in the Secretary of State contest,
making roll-off 16.0%. ( See Table 9.)
TABLE 9.

Roll-OH Between Participation in Presidential and Secretary of State

Races

Presidential Race Separate . . . . . . .
Both Races Together . . . . . . . . . . . .

1952
5.9%

1956
16.6%
..

1960
11.6%

1964
19.9%

1968
Mean
16.0% 17.5%
8.8%

The roll-off rate seems to increase substantially when the Presidential
race is separated from the rest . The mean roll-off rate for the years
when the race was separate, 17.5%, was twice that for the years when
the races were combined, 8.8%.
This evidence suggests the possibility of voting a straight ticket by
pulling one lever is very inviting for a voter. The more levers one is
required to use, the less likely is one to participate in the less visible
races. Hence, the Durham County statistics reaffirm the proposition
that many voters are enticed into voting a ticket that requires the least
effort.
In summation, statistics from several Durham County elections
have substantiated many of the propositions in the literaure about the
effects of variations in ballot form. George B. Mather's :findings about
the differences in voting machine ballots and paper ballots were tested
and verified in the 1952 election. We found, as did Mather, that voters
were more likely to vote on referendum questions when paper ballots
were used. Additionally, there was some indication that the Durham
County results concurred with Thomas' :findings that the use of voting
machines could affect a referendum election outcome. Thomas feels
that voting machines tend to screen out more negative votes than
positive ones, and we, too, found some evidence that Constitutional
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reforms passed by larger percentages when voting machines were used.
Ballot positioning , also, was found to play a role in determining the
rate of participation for particular races. Our study of a series of Congressional and Senatorial contests showed us that races at the top of a
ballot will receive more votes by virtue of their position on the ballot.
Wh en these races were positioned at the middle or end of the ballot,
they received fewer votes than they did at the beginning. Hence, as
the ballot gets longer, the roll-off increases as well. Finally, we found
that when the Presidential race is placed on the same line as other
races and when one is able to vote for all the contests by pulling one
lever, roll-off decreases substantially. We can explain this in one of two
ways: ( 1) favorable positioning of otherwise less visible races increases
both the attention given to these races and thus the participation rate
as well; or, ( 2) the ability to vote a straight ticket with minimal effort
is an enticing alternative. Undeniably, the ballot form can be a very
important determinant of election outcom es.
Finally, however, we must return to our findings that ballot forms
in Presidential and off-year elections serve to reinforce the behavioral
differences in the respective electorates. What would seem an interesting
line of inquiry for future research is to determine exactly how ballot
form and individual motivation interact. To what extent can core voters
withstand the fatiguing effects of complex ballots and less visible positioning? And how sensitive are peripheral voters to these same variations
in ballot form? Walker found that the more educated and more informed voters were more able to withstand the fatiguing complexities
of ballot form, 21 and Campbell and Miller hav e demonstrated how motivational factors can affect straight or split ticket voting. 22 What would
be interesting to determine is exactly how institutional factors such as
ballot form int erac t witl1 systematic differences between the predominantly core-composed off-year electorate and th e less predominantly
core-composed Presidential year electorate.
Walker , op. cit., p. 460.
Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight
and Split Ticket Voting," American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), p. 311.
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